Conference Global Threats to Biological Security. Administrative circular international conference "global threats to biological security: problems and solutions

02.11.2017

On the results of the work of the international conference "Global threats to biological security: problems and solutions"

Has successfully completed its work in Sochi international Conference"Global Biosafety Threats: Problems and Solutions", which was organized by the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation.

The conference brought together over 120 participants from 27 countries, international and public organizations, representatives of the scientific community.

The Russian delegation was represented by the Head of Rospotrebnadzor, Chief State Sanitary Doctor of the Russian Federation Anna Popova, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Ryabkov, as well as representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. The conference was attended by leading experts from foreign countries working in the field of biological safety.

The final plenary session of the Conference was dedicated to the future of the BTWC and the work program for 2018-2020.

The conference showed that the formation of global threats to biological safety is influenced by many factors and the issues of countering these threats are becoming increasingly important in modern world... The increasing number of cross-border travel, the growth of international trade, the development of biotechnology, regional conflicts, terrorism exacerbate the risks of the emergence and global spread of dangerous pathogens, both as a result of natural processes and as a result of the deliberate spread of microorganisms and toxins.

In this regard, the conference noted that the prevention and response to threats to biological security of a natural and deliberate nature require close multilateral cooperation, strengthening supranational mechanisms to contain the development and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, the development of international cooperation to provide assistance in the management of health risks associated with infections.

In this context, Russian mobile anti-epidemic formations aroused particular interest as a tool for ensuring biological safety. In particular, the use of specialized anti-epidemic brigades (SPEB) of Rospotrebnadzor and mobile complexes of the Russian Ministry of Defense for the analysis of pathogenic biological materials. SPEBs of Rospotrebnadzor the latest generation and "Sych" of the RChBZ troops of the Ministry of Defense of Russia were presented at the exhibition for review.

During the Conference, the need for open, trusting and universal implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was repeatedly emphasized.

One of the fundamental mechanisms for effectively countering global threats to biological security, according to the conference participants, is the BTWC, which is essential for international peace and safety. Reducing the level of such threats will be facilitated by the full compliance by states with all obligations assumed under the BTWC, both in terms of excluding the possibility of using bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and in terms of promoting the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information on the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

Based on the results of the speeches and discussions held, it can be noted that the following should be considered as the priority global threats to biological safety today:

Unusual spread of known and emerging dangerous pathogens;

Misuse of microorganisms and toxins for military and terrorist purposes;

Uncontrolled biotechnology research related to BTWC conducted by government and non-government actors;

Misuse of scientific and technological advances in biology;

Excessive integration of the spheres of international security and international health;

Attempts to “dilute” the BTWC regime and create mechanisms for control over the development of biotechnologies parallel to the BTWC;

Global imbalances in biotechnology development that reduce the collective capacity to prevent and respond to transboundary biological security threats.

The participants noted that the program of intersessional work, aimed at discussing priority tasks for the implementation of the BTWC and the development and implementation of practical mechanisms for the implementation of its articles, makes a significant contribution to the strengthening and implementation of the Convention as a whole.

Taking into account the above, the conference participants expressed their commitment to the goal of strengthening the BTWC and, based on the decision of the VIII BTWC Review Conference (November 7-25, 2016), call on the BTWC member states during the annual meeting (December 4-8, 2017, Geneva) to take all efforts to make progress on substantive issues and on the process until the next IX Review Conference, in order to reach consensus on the intersessional process.

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Among a wide range of biological threats, a special place is occupied by the danger associated with the use of pathogens of infectious diseases of humans, animals and plants as weapons. The consequences of such use can be catastrophic, and therefore biological weapons are justifiably classified as weapons of mass destruction.

In an effort to reduce the horrors of war associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction, the leading powers in 1925 developed. However, this treaty did not impose restrictions or prohibitions on the development of biological weapons and only concerned its non-use in war between the states parties to the Protocol. Almost immediately after its adoption, the obligations contained in it began to be interpreted as not prohibiting retaliatory use, which contributed to the development of the doctrine of deterrence and the creation of appropriate arsenals for a retaliatory strike. The regime of the Geneva Protocol was not distinguished by its strength as a result of its open violation in the 1930s. both because of the use of chemical weapons and because of the non-participation in it for many decades by several militarily first-class powers. The Soviet Union joined the Geneva Protocol in 1928. In 2001, Russia withdrew all the reservations made by the USSR when it joined the Protocol - we call on everyone else to do the same without further delay.

The events of World War II confirmed the need to improve the international legal regime to reduce the danger of using biological weapons. Nevertheless, in the first twenty post-war years, the conditions for this were absent due to the fact that the leading states of the Western bloc carried out massive offensive biological programs. At the same time, they did it in a coordinated manner. By the end of the 1960s. there, however, they came to the conclusion that, in doctrinal terms, biological weapons duplicate nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction, and therefore, due to the expediency of economical spending of military budget funds, they can be abandoned. As a result, the conditions for international negotiations were formed. At that time, the Soviet Union put forward the initiative to develop a treaty banning both biological and chemical weapons. Supported by many developing countries, such a proposal, however, did not meet with approval in the West - they were in no hurry to give up their then advantages in the means of waging chemical warfare, especially the new at that time phosphorus-organic toxic substances. Therefore, the scope of the talks that began in Geneva included only biological agents, as well as toxic waste products of living organisms - toxins. In 1971, at the last stage of negotiations, the text of the future Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons was coordinated in a bilateral format between the two superpowers of that time - the USSR and the USA. The great intellectual contribution of Great Britain to the development of its text should also be noted. It is no coincidence that these three states were appointed depositaries of the BTWC, and their ratifications were identified as a condition for the entry into force of the treaty, which took place in 1975.

The mechanisms for implementing the Convention largely reflect the realities of the international situation of that era, characterized by the confrontation between two different socio-political systems, known as the Cold War. Due to the confrontational mentality, it was not possible to envisage procedures for verifying compliance with the new treaty and to create an organization to assist in the implementation of its provisions. However, the very fact of the appearance of such a Convention in a short period of relaxation of tensions can be considered a great success, since a few years later the Cold War as a paradigm of confrontation began to be unleashed with renewed vigor, which until the second half of the 1980s. put an end to the prospects for the conclusion of major agreements in the field of disarmament.

The first ten years of the BTWC implementation have confirmed the opinion about the need to correct its congenital defects. Taking advantage of the improved international situation, the Soviet Union at the Second BTWC Review Conference in 1986 for the first time raised the question of developing a control mechanism. However, other countries were not ready for this, and the opportunity to start such work was then lost. Who knows what the biological disarmament regime would look like now if the Soviet initiative were accepted? History, however, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. In 1991, at the end of its existence, the USSR again supported the idea of developing a verification mechanism.

1992-1993 already the Russian delegation actively participated in the work of the VEREX group of governmental experts on the consideration of verification issues from a scientific and technical point of view and contributed to the identification, formulation and assessment of 21 potential verification measures and their various combinations.

Subsequently, in 1994, Russia, along with others, advocated the beginning of negotiations on the development of an additional legally binding protocol to the BTWC and actively participated in them for the next six years. Thus, there is a considerable Russian contribution to the draft Protocol, which was supposed to be approved at the Fifth Review Conference at the end of 2001. The breakdown in July 2001 of the negotiations that were nearing completion turned out to be a strong shock for us, like many other states, derailed 10 years of multilateral diplomacy efforts. Then we did everything possible to save at least something and not allow the huge work done to be completely nullified. In particular, we, together with a sane majority, managed to preserve the negotiating mandate of the Protocol and prevent its abolition. It is still operational and is awaiting the time when circumstances will allow the resumption of the relevant efforts. A 2014 poll conducted by the Russian Foreign Ministry, in which more than 40 states took part, confirmed the continuing interest of the majority in strengthening the BTWC by adopting an additional protocol to it.

At the same time, it should be noted that since 2001 the negotiation process within the BTWC has not been unblocked - the same political obstacles continue to exist with regard to the 1994 mandate. Old attempts to rewrite history with the assertion that the BTWC is allegedly unverifiable and work in this area is futile continue to continue. Such claims contradict the findings of the VEREX experts, who, as I said, in 1993, after a two-year study, agreed that potential verification measures could be helpful in increasing transparency by helping to ensure that states are complying with their commitments. BTWC. The experts emphasized that, from a scientific and technical point of view, some verification measures would contribute to increased efficiency and better implementation of the Convention and recognized that proper and effective verification could strengthen the BTWC. These are all scientifically sound findings supported by a broad consensus. Against this background, the attempts of individual states, blocking the resumption of negotiations on the BTWC verification mechanism, to gain unilateral access to foreign microbiological objects of interest to them, about which they never tire of spreading the most ridiculous rumors, look absurd. It is unclear why they need to inspect such facilities if they deny the possibility of verification within the BTWC. Probably, all the same, they allow the added value of verification, but only in their own interests - the principle of reciprocity does not allow them to go to the belief in their own exclusivity and, possibly, other reasons that they prefer not to talk about.

Russia, along with many states, believes that the most effective way to strengthen the Convention would be the adoption of a legally binding protocol covering all of its provisions, including verification. This is our constant long-term goal. At the same time, at this stage, we are ready to go to the development and adoption of auxiliary measures and decisions that would help to strengthen the BTWC regime in the short and medium term.

In this context, over the past few years, Russia has prepared and presented several promising initiatives related to improving the implementation of many of the provisions of the Convention.

So, in December 2015, together with Armenia, Belarus and China, we circulated a proposal to start negotiations on the development of a legally binding document to improve the implementation of the BTWC, including the following areas:

Confidence-building measures;

National implementation;

Monitoring of scientific and technical achievements;

International cooperation for peaceful purposes;

Assistance and protection against biological weapons;

Investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons.

The proposal was of a compromise nature in an attempt to postpone the solution of verification issues for the future, but in no way canceling or replacing the negotiating mandate of 1994. It aroused great interest among many countries, but the lack of the necessary reserve of political will has not yet allowed to proceed to its practical implementation.

In preparation for last year's Eighth Review Conference, Russia presented several initiatives and projects that have a practical focus and undoubted added value in terms of creating specific mechanisms to implement the provisions of the Convention.

First of all, it is necessary to note the initiative to create mobile biomedical units under the auspices of the BTWC to provide assistance to the affected state in the event of the use of biological weapons, to investigate such use and to assist in combating epidemics of various origins. Its implementation would greatly contribute to improving the implementation of three articles of the Convention at once: Article VII (assistance and protection against biological weapons), Article X (international cooperation in the prevention of disease) and Article VI (investigation of violations). Moreover, a synergistic effect and significant cost savings would be achieved, since mobile units, being multifunctional, could be used to solve a wide range of tasks.

If we talk about the positioning of mobile units in the strategy of comprehensively countering the threat of using biological agents as weapons, then we were guided by the following considerations. Monitoring compliance with bans on the development and production of biological weapons requires monitoring activities, including the declaration of relevant dual-use facilities and on-site visits. There is nothing new here - a similar approach is used by the IAEA and the OPCW. However, as a result of the breakdown of negotiations on the development of the Protocol in 2001, the parameters of such a control mechanism could not be agreed upon. Therefore, there is no objective evidence of compliance with these provisions of the Convention. This creates a situation of uncertainty and raises questions about the real state of affairs. Concern in this regard is only amplified by the excessive funding of dual-use microbiological programs, dubious experiments with causative agents of deadly diseases (especially aerosol experiments), the increase in military biomedical activity outside the national territory and other risk factors. For these reasons, the threat of the use of biological weapons by both state and non-state actors cannot be discounted, especially since such use can be disguised as natural outbreaks of infectious diseases among humans, animals or plants. Based on this, it is necessary to have in readiness the forces and means of rapid reaction, capable of quickly dealing with the situation on the spot and taking urgent action to stop the epidemic and its further elimination. If signs of deliberate spread of the disease are found, appropriate investigations should also be carried out to establish the facts and bring those responsible to justice. This is the logic of the Russian initiative on mobile biomedical units as a means of strengthening the BTWC and improving its implementation. Today we will hear more than once about functionality and examples of the successful use of specialized rapid response units, both Russian and foreign. In our opinion, this is a confirmation that our initiative is deeply thought-out, scientifically grounded and in demand in practice.

The area of monitoring scientific and technological developments related to the Convention is no less important. The purpose of such monitoring, on the one hand, is to identify and analyze the risks associated with certain areas of research and technology in order to reduce such risks to an acceptable level, while not harming scientific and technological progress. On the other hand, it is necessary to raise awareness and widely disseminate knowledge and achievements that can help in realizing the objectives of the BTWC, first of all, in the prevention of infectious diseases, regardless of the nature of their occurrence. In this regard, in 2016 Russia developed a proposal to establish a representative Scientific Advisory Committee under the auspices of the Convention. Structures of this kind are widely used in international practice, and today in our program we will have a report on an example of the successful functioning of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Council.

Another important issue is increasing the transparency of the biological profile activities related to the BTWC. A special risk factor in this regard is military biomedical activity carried out outside the national territory. We note a significant expansion of the scale of such activities, which makes us think about its true direction and content. We are talking about this firsthand, since we increasingly note such manifestations in countries close to us. Last year, on this topic, Russia presented a detailed proposal for improving the BTWC's confidence-building measures. We believe that such an increase in transparency will help to improve mutual understanding and contribute to the implementation of the objectives of the Convention.

Dear Colleagues,

I have focused only on the most significant aspects of the Russian agenda to strengthen the Convention and improve its implementation. We are, of course, ready to consider and support proposals from other countries of a similar orientation. We hope that consideration of each other's interests and willingness to compromise will serve as a reliable basis for reaching an agreement on new program work under the BTWC for the period 2018-2020, to be adopted in a month at the Meeting of States Parties in Geneva.

Thank you for the attention.

1. To hold on November 1-2, 2017 in Sochi the international scientific and practical conference "Global threats to biological security. Problems and solutions" (hereinafter - the conference).

2. Rospotrebnadzor to organize the preparation and holding of the conference.

4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, assist in ensuring the safety of citizens and public order in the venues of the conference and events of the cultural and educational program.

5. Rospotrebnadzor, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, shall ensure that foreign guests are invited to participate in the conference.

6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia shall ensure the issuance of visas in accordance with the established procedure at the request of Rospotrebnadzor to participants and guests of the conference, as well as to representatives of the press without charging fees for their issuance.

7. Financial support of the expenses related to the organization and holding of the conference shall be made within the budgetary allocations provided for by Rospotrebnadzor in the federal budget for 2017.

Document overview

On November 1-2, 2017, it was decided to hold an international scientific and practical conference "Global threats to biological security. Problems and solutions" in Sochi.

Rospotrebnadzor is responsible for organizing and holding the conference.

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In this context, over the past few years, Russia has prepared and presented several promising initiatives related to improving the implementation of many of the provisions of the Convention.

Confidence-building measures;

National implementation;

Monitoring of scientific and technical achievements;

International cooperation for peaceful purposes;

Assistance and protection against biological weapons;

Investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons.

If we talk about the positioning of mobile units in the strategy of comprehensively countering the threat of using biological agents as weapons, then we were guided by the following considerations. Monitoring compliance with bans on the development and production of biological weapons requires monitoring activities, including the declaration of relevant dual-use facilities and on-site visits. There is nothing new here - a similar approach is used by the IAEA and the OPCW. However, as a result of the breakdown of negotiations on the development of the Protocol in 2001, the parameters of such a control mechanism could not be agreed upon. Therefore, there is no objective evidence of compliance with these provisions of the Convention. This creates a situation of uncertainty and raises questions about the real state of affairs. Concern in this regard is only amplified by the excessive funding of dual-use microbiological programs, dubious experiments with causative agents of deadly diseases (especially aerosol experiments), the increase in military biomedical activity outside the national territory and other risk factors. For these reasons, the threat of the use of biological weapons by both state and non-state actors cannot be discounted, especially since such use can be disguised as natural outbreaks of infectious diseases among humans, animals or plants. Based on this, it is necessary to have in readiness the forces and means of rapid reaction, capable of quickly dealing with the situation on the spot and taking urgent action to stop the epidemic and its further elimination. If signs of deliberate spread of the disease are found, appropriate investigations should also be carried out to establish the facts and bring those responsible to justice. This is the logic of the Russian initiative on mobile biomedical units as a means of strengthening the BTWC and improving its implementation. Today we will hear more than once about the functionality and examples of the successful use of specialized rapid response units, both Russian and foreign. In our opinion, this is a confirmation that our initiative is deeply thought-out, scientifically grounded and in demand in practice.

Dear Colleagues,

I have focused only on the most significant aspects of the Russian agenda to strengthen the Convention and improve its implementation. We are, of course, ready to consider and support proposals from other countries of a similar orientation. We hope that taking into account each other's interests and willingness to compromise will serve as a reliable basis for reaching agreement on a new work program under the BTWC for the period 2018-2020, which should be adopted in a month at the meeting of the participating States in Geneva.

Thank you for the attention.

On November 1-2, Sochi hosted a conference “Global threats to biological security: problems and solutions”.

It brought together over 100 participants from 40 countries of the world. The main theme is as in the conditions rapid development medicine to retain control over potentially dangerous projects and biotechnologies, which today are becoming available to a wide range of people, including due to imperfections in national legislation.

“We see unusual behavior of already known and understood microorganisms. Today, the level of scientific and technical development is such that the possibilities of working with the gene are absolutely real, "said the head of Rospotrebnadzor, the chief state sanitary doctor of the Russian Federation. Anna Popova.

In such conditions, Popova noted, the availability of new technologies scares. You can order equipment that will allow you to conduct experiments with viruses via the Internet.

“For example, today in the United States it is actually allowed to set up laboratories in the garage. On the Internet, you can easily find tutorials on how to organize it. In addition, there are no barriers to getting dangerous pathogens. All the necessary information and base is freely available, ”she said.

“Among a wide range of biological threats, a special place is occupied by the danger of research with the aim of deliberately contracting human infectious diseases. The consequences can be catastrophic, it is not for nothing that biological weapons are qualified as weapons of mass destruction, - in turn, said the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Sergey Ryabkov... "The threat of its use by both state and non-state actors cannot be discounted, especially since such use can be disguised as natural outbreaks of infectious diseases, among people, animals or plants."

According to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, the situation is aggravated by the fact that at this moment there is no objective evidence of compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In addition to the fact that this creates a situation of uncertainty and raises questions about the real state of affairs, there are also concerns about the excessive amounts of funding for dual-use microbiological programs, the conduct of dubious experiments with causative agents of deadly diseases, especially aerosol experiments and the increase in military biomedical activity. outside the national territory.

In this regard, experts say, the common task should be to strengthen mechanisms to control the prevention of the development, storage and accumulation of biological and toxin weapons within the BTWC.

It also requires close multilateral cooperation, strengthening supranational mechanisms to contain the development and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, and developing international cooperation to provide assistance in the management of health risks associated with infections.

In addition, Ryabkov noted, today it is necessary to have in readiness the forces and means of rapid reaction, capable of quickly dealing with the situation on the spot and taking urgent measures to stop the epidemic.

So, in the Russian Federation there are mobile anti-epidemic formations as a tool for ensuring biological safety. In particular, specialized anti-epidemic brigades (SPEB) of Rospotrebnadzor and mobile complexes of the Russian Ministry of Defense for the analysis of pathogenic biological materials.

“Our dedicated anti-epidemic teams performed at their best when they worked in Guinea. We have done a lot to help manage the Ebola outbreak. But during this period we have already worked out and counteraction to the spread of yellow fever in Guinea, measles in Guinea, cholera in Guinea. And this is also a very indicative result of our technologies, our well-trained specialists, our training system, our biosafety system, ”said Popova.

For your information:

Earlier, on October 30, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, he said that someone is conducting a targeted collection of biological materials from Russians, and we are talking about different ethnic groups. Press Secretary of the Head of State Dmitry Peskov explained that the special services have information about such actions on the part of some emissaries and non-governmental organizations.

And on October 31, the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on Education and Science Gennady Onishchenko told the media that the government was developing a law on Russia's biological safety. In December, it should be submitted to the State Duma.

The deputy noted the need to take under serious control the work of foreign clinics and laboratories that conduct medical research of the Russian population.

“We allowed them to the most intimate, today in many clinics of large cities of our country they conduct research, conduct it with high quality, but have the opportunity to study this material and transfer data abroad,” Onishchenko added.

Based on media materials