Communications of the Second World War. Wehrmacht

Military communications in Germany were at a high professional level - this was facilitated by a small number of combat vehicles (in comparison with the USSR) and the familiarity of the officer corps with the advantage of command and control using radio communications. Of course, not everything was perfect. However, the "blitzkrieg" tactics, which dominated the Wehrmacht since the late 30s, were unthinkable without the communication of various combat units of the same type of troops (usually tank and motorized rifle) among themselves, as well as interaction with supporting artillery and aviation units. In the first part of the material, we examined the specifics of telephone and radio communications in the Red Army, and now, in the second part of the material, we will consider the solutions that were used in the Wehrmacht, as well as the equipment that was available to the units of the Red Army under Lend-Lease.

Communication in the Wehrmacht

Preparing for war, the German command back in 1936 adopted the doctrine of military radio communications, which determined the range of radio equipment for various branches of the armed forces, their frequency ranges, etc. Radio communication was considered as one of the decisive factors in the superiority of individual armored and motorized units of Germany over similar parts of other opponents, so the installation of transmission devices and receiving wireless devices was considered in the aspect of a "big" tactical task, starting from use within a separate military unit (platoon, company , tank), and to the level of the leadership of the armies. True, the Germans were by no means original in this matter - the same developments were in the Red Army. Another thing is that in terms of the pace of development of new radio equipment in the pre-war years, Germany was significantly ahead of both the USSR and the allies. This was objectively due to the fact that it was in Germany in the early 1930s. Inventions were patented that largely determined the development of radio engineering for many decades.

Knapsack combined-arms all-wave receiver "Berta" - 1935 production.

Field phone FF-33 - used in the infantry units of the Wehrmacht.

Small field switch for ten subscribers.

After 1933, the German radio industry was able to create more than 1 thousand different types of receivers, transmitters and radio stations for all areas of military affairs. But not many copies were used. However, let's be realistic. Although the General Staff of the German Ground Forces formulated two main requirements for the saturation of the Wehrmacht - "full motorization and stable radio communications", - in practice they were not fulfilled. Yes, all mobile armored vehicles of the Wehrmacht at the time of the outbreak of the war were radio-equipped (that is, they had a receiver), but this was organized for the simple reason that there were not so many of them (several thousand Wehrmacht tanks against tens of thousands in the Red Army). In addition, with the "feedback" of this "tank avalanche" and, consequently, operational control, it was a little tight. The situation was even worse with interaction with infantry and artillery - it was also in a limited mode, since tank and infantry units, for example, used different non-overlapping frequencies and were forced to act through higher headquarters. In addition, the transition to radio communication was psychologically difficult for German officers. At one time, Chief of the General Staff Beck asked Guderian: "How are they going to direct the battle without a table with maps or a telephone?"

Portable VHF infantry radio "Dora-2" - 1936 production.

Mobile infantry radio station "Friedrich" (1940).

Portable VHF infantry radio "Friedrich" (1942) and on the right - a motor soldier for charging batteries in the field (1944).

The basis of all the armies of the world of that time was rifle and motorized units. At the beginning of the war, portable VHF radios were used at the level of companies and platoons in the Wehrmacht - for example, Torn.Fu.d2, which was developed back in 1936 and was successfully used until the very end of the war. However, the operating range of Torn.Fu.d2 (33.8-38 MHz) did not allow direct communication with tanks or with the new Feldfu.f VHF radio stations that appeared in 1944 (a successful development that served as a prototype for our R-105M) . In addition, in the Wehrmacht at the level of platoons and companies, along with radio and telephone, the old method of communication was preserved - solar communication, when messages were transmitted in Morse code during the day with the help of a mirror, and at night with a flashlight. Quite primitive, but in many cases very effective. In addition, the German infantry battalion had armored personnel carriers with VHF radios with a 3 km transmission and reception radius and, on the same armored personnel carriers, radio stations for communication with the command. Formally, there were twelve of these armored vehicles in the battalion, in practice, after the active battles of the first months and until the end of the war - no more than half.

On the left - an Emil tank VHF receiver (manufactured in 1936), on the right - a 10-watt Caesar tank transmitter (manufactured in 1938). This "bundle" was used to connect the tanks with each other and with the commander.

The tank VHF receiver of the ground-to-air channel Ukw.E.d1 (manufactured in 1939) was used to communicate tank units with dive bombers and attack aircraft.

Fug17 is an air-to-ground airborne radio station.

30-watt medium wave tank transmitter.

Fu16 - 10-watt radio station for self-propelled guns (for example, "Ferdinand"); on the left is the Heinrich receiver, on the right is the transmitter.

An extremely interesting option has been developed and used to communicate with various branches of the military since 1939. For example, in addition to the 10-watt Fu 5 radio stations that provided communication between German tanks in the 27-33 MHz range, 20-watt Fu 7 radio stations were additionally installed on command tanks and armored personnel carriers, which operated in the 42-48 MHz range and were intended to communicate with airplanes. FuG 17 radio stations were installed on aircraft to communicate with tanks (usually the station was installed on the command aircraft of a squadron of dive bombers). Thus, the commander of a tank battalion could calmly, acting on the battlefield, call and coordinate the work of several combat squadrons in real mode according to the principle "destroy the battery on the edge of the forest to the left of my battle formations!" Such radios were installed on Pz.Bef.Wg tanks. III, V, VI, VI B Tiger II, 35(t), Pz.Beow. IV, armored vehicles Sd.Kfz. 250/3 and 251/3, Sd Kfz. 260. Theoretically, each tank regiment could direct aircraft for its own breakthrough. In the tank forces of the Red Army, everything was different - only the observation post of the division commander had a direct telegraph connection via the ST-35 terminal with attack aircraft that interacted with the army, which was rare, usually it was supported through the headquarters of the front or the headquarters of the air army attached to it.

Models of receivers and transmitters for Luftwaffe aircraft (left), airborne receiver for blind landing on a radio beam from an airfield.

German pilots actively used the radio stations installed on fighters during the war in Spain in 1936. By July 1938, the Bf-109C-1 aircraft had replaced the He-51. The pilots appreciated the new aircraft, which, in addition to a more powerful engine and enhanced weapons, had another important advantage - the FuG 7 radio station, which made it possible to ensure the interaction of fighters in a group, as well as receive instructions from the ground. German Ju-87s left a terrible memory of themselves with Soviet infantrymen and tankmen. The machines were slow-moving and, generally speaking, did not represent anything unique - but they brilliantly destroyed targets, since there was a special officer on the ground who directed the planes. In addition, two staff aircraft usually flew as part of the Junkers unit, which led the raid by radio.

VHF radio station "Doretta" - model Kl.Fu.Spr.d.

The Germans managed to completely solve the problem of interaction between different types of armed forces only in 1944 with the advent of a small VHF radio station "Doretta" (Kl.Fu.Spr.d) - it had common channels both with tank radio stations and with Feldfu.f , and with Torn.Fu.d2. "Doretta" turned out to be really small-sized, it was worn on a waist belt, but for all its diminutiveness, it allowed for confident communication at distances of 1-2 km. True, for this they used a rather long vertical antenna and a heavy battery. It was then that German fighters and dive bombers began to be guided from the ground by a whole network of gunners with precisely such miniature radio stations.

Receiver for control services Fu.H.E.c (production - 1938).

VHF receiver for control services Fu.H.E.c (production - 1940).

Radio intelligence was also actively used in the German army. For example, special receivers and direction-finding stations were in service with radio intelligence regiments - in the early 40s and until the end of the war, there were eight of them in the Wehrmacht, of which six were sent to the Russian front. In addition, in Berlin, at the main headquarters of the German armed forces, there was a radio eavesdropping center - the highest body in charge of radio intelligence. The radio regiment usually consisted of two or three radio reconnaissance groups, a long-range radio reconnaissance company and a short-range radio reconnaissance company. Each company consisted of an eavesdropping platoon (70 people) and a decryption platoon, where people with a higher mathematical education served. There was also a platoon of translators (30 people) and a platoon for processing radio intelligence data.

15-watt combined-arms HF radio.

The basis of all the armies of the world of that time was rifle and motorized units. At the beginning of the war, at the level of companies and platoons in the Wehrmacht, portable VHF radio stations were used - for example, Torn.Fu.d2, which was developed back in 1936 and was successfully used until the very end of the war. However, the operating range of Torn.Fu.d2 (33.8-38 MHz) did not allow direct communication with tanks or with the new Feldfu.f VHF radio stations that appeared in 1944 (a successful development that served as a prototype for our R-105M) . In addition, in the Wehrmacht at the level of platoons and companies, along with radio and telephone, the old method of communication was preserved - heliocommunication, when messages were transmitted in Morse code during the day with the help of a mirror, and at night with a flashlight. Quite primitive, but in many cases very effective. In addition, the German infantry battalion had armored personnel carriers with VHF radios with a 3 km transmission and reception radius and, on the same armored personnel carriers, radio stations for communication with the command. Formally, there were twelve of these armored vehicles in the battalion, in practice, after the active battles of the first months and until the end of the war - no more than half.

The tank VHF receiver of the ground-to-air channel Ukw.E.d1 (manufactured in 1939) was used to communicate tank units with dive bombers and attack aircraft.

Fug17 is an air-to-ground airborne radio station.

30-watt medium wave tank transmitter.

Fu16 - 10-watt radio station for self-propelled guns (for example, "Ferdinand"); on the left is the Heinrich receiver, on the right is the transmitter.

Samples of receivers and transmitters for Luftwaffe aircraft (left), onboard receiver for blind landing by radio beam from the airport.

VHF radio "Doretta" - model Kl.Fu.Spr.d.

Receiver for control services Fu.H.E.c (production - 1938).

VHF receiver for control services Fu.H.E.c (production - 1940).

etam: Some of the photos for this post were stolen from the site. RKK Radio Museum. Below are a few more items that I found interesting.

Semi-automatic mechanical telegraph key The Eddystone Bug Key

Telegraph key J-45
with a clip for fastening on the knee of the radio operator in the vehicle. After World War II marked KY-116/U, NATO (USA)

Familiar key, isn't it? Approximately on this I studied at the training camp, they retrained the pancake, from the construction battalion to signalmen)))

Telegraph key from the BODO telegraph set with switching switches
Produced by Siemens & Halske in St. Petersburg before the revolution and after nationalization. The serial number of this model is "3". Railway and other types of wire communication in Russia, 1920s

Learning key
The use of such keys by radio operators of partisan detachments during the war is known.
(until 1941, USSR)

R-104M

R-131

Tank radio station 71TK-3
Found in a swamp on the border of the Luga and Gatchina districts of the Leningrad region in the retreat zone of the 41st Rifle Corps.

Quartz calibrator for calibrating the scales of radio transmitting devices (by zero beats).
Found in the Novgorod region. Produced by factory #197 in 1940.

Tank radio receiver 71TK-1
Serial number 601, released in 1937. Found near the city of Kingisepp, in the battlefields of 1941. Presumably stood on the BT-5 tank.

Communication equipment of the Wehrmacht

Tank receiver Ukw.E.e.

It was part of the Fu 5 tank radio station operating in the VHF band 27-33 MHz. This receiver was released in 1944.

Special purpose radio receiver SE 98/3.

The radio station was intended to equip reconnaissance groups. Notice the inscriptions in English. The receiver is made on three low-voltage lamps of the 11th series (turtles) according to the 1-V-1 scheme with a regenerative detector.

Radio receiver Torn.E.b.

One of the most famous combined arms receivers for the German army, it was produced almost unchanged until the end of the war. 2-V-1 direct amplification receiver with regenerative detector. This copy was made in 1940.

VEFSUPER M517 is a fixed broadcast receiver. LW, MW and HF bands up to

18.4 MHz. Superheterodyne, IF 469 kHz. Radio tubes 6A8, 6K7, 6G7, 6F6S, 6E5 and 5Ts4S. Nutrition

from an alternating current network of 110, 127 or 220 V. Produced at the VEF plant in Riga (during the years of the German

during which occupation the plant was called AEG Ostlandwerk GmbH).

During the Second World War, VEFSUPER M517 receivers were supplied for the entertainment of military personnel

German Wehrmacht and paramilitaries in the territory of Latvia. On the front

the wall of the receiver is burned "Heereseigentum", which means "Property of the ground forces"

Communication parts equipment

Signalers were given specially designed models backpacks for radio stations(Fernspmchtornister) as service gear for specialized equipment and tools rather than carrying personal items. These knapsacks have three models, which are identical on the outside, except for a square of brown leather sewn on at the bottom edge, covered with unshorn calfskin of the lid flap. On the square, the numbers "1", "2", "3" were cut out in a stencil way, denoting the corresponding model. Inside, the knapsacks had a different arrangement of compartments and retaining loops in order to best place their contents. The satchels themselves were made of brown tarpaulin. The lid consisted of two sections, upper and lower, which folded outward, opening free access to the contents of the satchel. They fastened with two adjustable leather straps with slots for metal staples, into which narrower straps were inserted from above. Leather shoulder straps were attached to the back wall of the satchel. Several leather loops were sewn to the sides of the satchel and to the lower section of the lid to secure additional equipment.

The back side of the right saddle bag arr. 1934. Shoulder straps are visible, allowing dismounted cavalrymen to carry the bag as a satchel. (From the Troy Haley collection)

From the book 1937. Stalin's Anti-Terror author Shubin Alexander Vladlenovich

Secret connections On January 14, 1933, the OGPU carried out arrests of the Trotskyites. Many of them formally declared a break with Trotsky and opposition activities. I. Smirnov, E. Preobrazhensky and other 75 arrested were found to have letters from Trotsky from abroad, correspondence with Trotskyists,

From the book Military Thought in the USSR and in Germany author Mukhin Yury Ignatievich

Without communications in the air There was even less sense without communications from aircraft in the troops of the western districts. When our pilots knew where to fly and with whom to fight, they fought well even on weak equipment. Here is an example of the fighting on June 22 from a German source. “The 12th

author

Invisible connections J. V. Stalin's involvement in secret and super-conspiratorial activities contributed to the emergence and expansion of his ties both within the party and outside it. Of great importance in this regard, first of all, was his acquaintance with the brothers V.

From the book Who was standing behind Stalin? author Ostrovsky Alexander Vladimirovich

Invisible connections 1 GF IML. F. 8. Op. 2. Part 1. D. 25. L. 142–143.

From the book Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] author Glantz David M

COMMUNICATION TROOPS The signal troops of the Red Army were poorly equipped, severely understaffed and incapable of carrying out the primary tasks of wartime. They were the weakest part of the entire military structure of the army on the eve of the operation prepared by the Germans.

From the book Day "N". False Viktor Suvorov the author Bugaev Andrey

Chapter 12 No connection! When you get acquainted with the works of V. Suvorov, you involuntarily pay attention to the selectivity with which the author operates with facts. Everything that fits into his theory is analyzed in more than detail and brought to the fore. But war, such a war, has drawn

From the book Throne of Lucifer. Brief Essays on Magic and the Occult the author Parnov Eremey

From the book Vladimir Lenin. Path Choice: Biography. author Loginov Vladlen Terentyevich

"PERSONAL CONNECTIONS" On August 15, Ulyanov leaves Geneva for Munich, but on the way he stops in Nuremberg, where it was necessary to agree with the German Social Democrats on some details of their technical assistance to the publication of Iskra and Zarya. All the first days a painful impression

From the book Daily Life of the Italian Mafia author Calvi Fabrizio

Connections with the town Despite the huge fortunes acquired in just a few months thanks to such operations, the "men of honor" in Palermo could not tear themselves away from their land. The sudden arrival of wealth did not in the least alienate them from these small towns, where they and

From the book Byzantine Civilization by Guillou André

Relationships of dependency The history of the relationships that held Byzantine society together—family, corporations, city—is a demonstration of one of that society's most natural qualities—independence. According to the 8th century code of life, Byzantium avoided

From the book Secrets of Old Persia author Nepomniachtchi Nikolai Nikolaevich

Maintaining Contacts Until the Mongol conquest of Iran and the establishment of the Muslim Sultanate in Delhi in 1206, and the Muslim conquest of the province of Gujarat in 1297, contacts between Iranian Zoroastrians and the Parsis of India were fairly regular.

From the book Reform in the Red Army Documents and materials 1923-1928. [Book 1] author Team of authors

From the book Man of the Third Millennium author Burovsky Andrey Mikhailovich

About communication Even the most primitive telephone, when the "young lady" at the station connected us with the subscriber, opened up unprecedented opportunities. And even more so an automatic telephone with international and long-distance communication. The ability to pick up and talk to someone on the other side of the Earth -

From the book Japan in the III-VII centuries. Ethnos, society, culture and the world around author Vorobyov Mikhail Vasilievich

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From the book Feudal Society the author Block Mark

3. Ties and breaks The treaty of vassalage bound two people of obviously unequal status. The old Norman law testifies to this very eloquently: if a lord killed his vassal or a vassal killed his lord, both of them are punishable by death, but a shameful execution

From the book Reform in the Red Army Documents and materials 1923-1928. t 1 author

No. 112 Report of the inspector of the signal troops of the Red Army N.M. Sinyavsky to the Inspector of the Red Army S.S. Kamenev "On the revision of the structure and staffing of district communications inspectorates" No. 6207830 November 1925 Secret I. The state of the signal troops (in addition to my report dated November 16, No. 62062). Based on the results

Original taken from bloggmaster in

Maybe someone will be interested in plunging into history. We saw a lot from films, but let's take a closer look at what our grandfathers fought with. How they forged a great victory.

Communication is always sacred, and even more important in battle..."

Command and control of troops without reliable means of communication is simply unthinkable - units cannot be quickly assembled into a shock fist or effectively lead them on the battlefield. Of course, during the Great Patriotic War, the situation with the saturation of combat units with communications equipment was completely different than now - there are no satellite communications and portable radios. Infantry, artillery and guards mortarmen mainly used wired telephones, and only tank troops, aviation and the Navy actively mastered radio communications. This material is about the means of communication used during the Second World War, which were used both in the Red Army and the Wehrmacht troops, as well as those devices that were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.

To do this, we will visit the Central Museum of the Russian Army in Moscow, as well as a special "RKK Radio Museum", which gave us much more information - its main expositions today have no analogues in Russia. In the first part of this essay, we will consider the means of communication used by the Red Army, in the second - the solutions that were used in the Wehrmacht, as well as the equipment that was available to the units of the Red Army under Lend-Lease.

Communication in the Red Army

Unfortunately, in the prewar years, the People's Commissariat of Communications of the USSR and the Communications Directorate of the Red Army did not provide the proper number of special enterprises that produced communications equipment. As the People's Commissar for Communications, Marshal of the Communications Troops Ivan Peresypkin writes in his memoirs, the communications industry was very low-powered. In the USSR there was a single plant "Krasnaya Zarya", which produced and supplied the country with telephone equipment of all types, the plant named after. Kulakov, who made telegraph devices ST-35 and Bodo, i.e. provided telegraph communications, and the plant them. Comintern, who made powerful radio equipment. Thus, by the beginning of the war with Germany, due to the insufficient capacity of the communications industry, it was not possible to carry out the planned program for re-equipping the signal troops with everything necessary. However, interesting means of communication were still present.

For instance, excellent radio station RB (3-R)- a portable transceiver half-duplex HF radio station for communication in infantry and artillery regimental networks. It was she who was located at the command post of battalions and regiments, received reports of breakthroughs and counterattacks, allowing coordination of actions over an area of several tens of square kilometers.

RB (3-R) Power was provided from dry batteries BAS-60 (four pieces) and a 2NKN-22 battery, which were placed in a separate battery box. Its release began in 1938. The RB model turned out to be so successful that the Americans in 42-43. even asked for a license to produce it, but they were denied. Modified radio station RB-M.

Or is it legendary "North bis"- the favorite radio station of special forces, osnaz, raiders-scouts and other special units. Suspended on her back, she saved the life of a radio operator more than once, taking on bullets from enemy rifles and submachine guns, fragments from anti-personnel mines and "stretch marks" - this example is well described in the novel "Star" by E. Kazakevich. In general, radio stations of the "North" type provided radio communication at a distance of up to 500 km, and with carefully selected radio frequencies and good transmission of radio waves, virtuoso radio operators often managed to increase their range to 600-700 km.

Radio station "North".

Thanks to the constant help of the People's Commissariat and the Main Directorate of Communications of the Red Army, the radio communication network used by the same Central Headquarters of the partisan movement (they mainly worked on devices of the "North" type) was constantly developing from month to month. If by the beginning of December 1942 the Central Headquarters had 145 active radio stations, then by the beginning of January 1944 there were already 424, maintaining contact with more than 1.1 thousand partisan detachments. ZAS complexes could also be delivered to the "North" - classified communications equipment, but it weighed a few more kilograms - therefore they preferred to speak in simple cipher, working on a changing schedule, on different waves and on maps with grids for coding the squares of the location of troops. In general, initially such devices were created for the GRU and the NKVD, but then they began to be transferred to the troops. Start of production - 1941 Produced even in besieged Leningrad.

Several types of A-7 infantry radio stations - in the photo there are three radio stations with different appearance, usually they also needed a set of batteries.
Complete set of A-7-A radio station in a wooden box.

The A-7-A radio station is a modification of the A-7 infantry VHF radio station. Powered by dry batteries BAS-80 (two pieces) and battery 2NKN-10. It was supplied to the troops from the beginning of 1944. It was intended for communication in the networks of rifle regiments and artillery battalions. With its help, it was possible to negotiate by radio from a command or observation post even through a telephone set connected to the radio station by a wire line up to 2 km long (this is so that the command post where it was located was not attacked by enemy artillery). In addition, this "hybrid" - such a thing could work as a telephone for communication by wire.

12-RP - shortwave infantry radio of the 1941 model. It consists of separate transmitter and receiver units.

At the beginning of the war, some part of the general military commanders overestimated wire communications and did not always believe in radio equipment. This attitude towards radio communications at the beginning of the war received a very apt definition - "radio fear". Unfortunately, this "disease" in 1941-1942 suffered a lot of commanders and officers of the headquarters of rifle units and formations. Even for a long time after the start of the war, even the officers of the front headquarters continued to consider the telephone as the main means of communication. Breaking the line for them was often tantamount to losing contact with subordinate troops. For reasons of an organizational and technical nature, the potential of radio communications in the Red Army was far from being fully used. True, radiophobia was not observed in aviation, in armored and mechanized troops, as well as in the Navy.

The transmitter of the military short-wave radio set RSB-F is a land-based version of the transmitter from the HF bomber radio set (RSB). Start of production - 1940. It was used as an exciter as part of powerful radio stations of the RAF-KV-3 type, or as an independent RSB-F radio station with US or KS-2 receivers. RSB-F radio stations could be mounted in cars, in carts, snowmobiles or in portable boxes. This was fixed by decisive measures - in 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief decided to introduce personal radio stations for commanders and commanders. Wherever the front commander or army commander is, a personal radio station should always be with him. Together with the radio operators at the radio station, there must have been an officer of the operational department and a cipher clerk. This decision was very important and played a big role in improving command and control. And already in the second half of the war, cases of underestimation of radio communications or the misuse of various means of communication were rare.
Combined arms radio station for rifle and artillery regiments 13-R. Due to the rapid offensive of the motorized infantry and tank forces of Germany in the first months of the war, the main factories that produced communications equipment (in Leningrad, Kyiv, Kharkov) were evacuated and were able to start production only in 1942. Therefore, all activities that were carried out to develop communications, in relation to material and technical support, were carried out partly due to the mobilization of internal resources, partly due to the evacuated property. The Red Army experienced a very great need for communications, but the industry temporarily did not supply them. What was the way out? In civilian communications institutions, telephone and telegraph sets were removed, portable telegraph stations were taken away, and all this was sent to the Red Army.
UNA-F-31 - a field telephone with a phonic call of the 1931 model. It appeared as a result of the improvement of the UNA-F-28 apparatus. With this phone, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War. Another extremely common type of communication on the battlefield is wired telephones. Now it seems that this is complete junk, especially for the younger generation living in the age of mobile communications. But do not underestimate this type of communication - in the absence of any infrastructure (especially cellular base stations), literally "in the field" such phones allow you to covertly control troops (you can eavesdrop on a telephone conversation only by connecting directly to the cable), they cannot be detected by activity their use, it is impossible to get an idea of the possible actions of the troops (defense, offensive, readiness for a breakthrough, etc.
TABIP-1 is a telephone set of 1941 with an inductor call, without power supplies. The principle of operation of the device is based on the Bell scheme, in which speech transmission occurred due to the EMF created in the line by a reversible electromagnetic primer of the telephone receiver.

In addition, these are inexpensive, mobile and highly functional systems that are mutually compatible with each other. Yes, and almost any sergeant with a secondary technical education who has completed a short course in handling such "hardware" can operate a field telephone.

Military telephones TAI-43 (a field telephone system with an inductor call of the 1943 model, it was produced in wooden boxes throughout the war) and UNA-FI-43 (had an increased range). They were used for telephone communication between large military headquarters via telegraph lines (simultaneously with the work of the telegraph), as well as for communication where it was necessary to use both phonic and inductor calls).
Field switch PK-10 for ten subscribers in a protective housing - usually used at the command post of a rifle or artillery regiment. 71-TK-1 - a tank HF transmitter of the 1933 model from the 71-TK-1 radio set, which provided two-way communication on armored vehicles - for example, just such devices were on Soviet BT-7 tanks. Separate transmitter and receiver units. "Malyutka-T" - a tank receiver, could be installed on armored vehicles of the rank and file.

Tank radios usually consisted of two blocks - a receiver and a transmitter, power was provided from the tank's on-board network through a special converter (umformer). Such radio stations were used mainly by unit commanders - the orders given by them had to be carried out unconditionally. In addition, the transmission of such radio stations was circular - simultaneously to everyone. It is noteworthy that the tank radio stations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht worked on different frequencies, so the opposing troops physically could not hear each other's orders.
The receiver of the aviation radio station RSI-4A (1941) and the transmitter of the aviation HF radio station RSI-4.

At the beginning of the war, the newest fighters of the Red Army Air Force found themselves with practically no radio communication between themselves, the command posts of the air regiments, as well as the VNOS (air surveillance, warning and communications) posts, not to mention the air controllers in the ground forces. For the most part, without radio communications, the Air Force fighter regiments entered combat operations in June 1941 - according to the military doctrine of that time, this was not necessary: the main task of the fighters was to cover large masses of attack aircraft and bombers that destroyed enemy airfields to gain air supremacy .

Receiving points for wire broadcasting in the USSR.
On radios in Germany, which could catch many radio stations in Europe, at the beginning of World War II, these signs were added.
Translation from German - like, not so scary. There was no total confiscation of radio receivers, as in the USSR.

By the way, only such radio stations were allowed to have private users in the USSR - each region of the country had its own radio station, and broadcasting was carried out via wired channels. The circuit was closed, and apart from official information, it was simply unrealistic to hear any other data through these receiving points. All other receivers were supposed to be handed over at the very beginning of the war - on June 25, 1941, the decision of the Politburo "On the handover of radio receivers and transmitters by the population" was made. It was formalized as a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. These radio receivers and transmitting devices were to be handed over for temporary storage within 5 days, in view of the fact that they could be used, as stated in the resolution, "by enemy elements for purposes directed to the detriment of Soviet power." From some of these devices, then the most common field radio stations for the troops were stamped.

By the middle of the war, the situation with radio communications in the Red Army had changed almost completely. As officers of the radio intelligence regiments of the Wehrmacht units admitted, "the work of Russian radio operators differed in many respects from the work of the British. Russians often changed radio data, used special passwords, worked at high speeds. All this made it difficult to intercept radio transmissions and eavesdrop on Russian radio stations ..."

In addition, during the war, for the first time in our army, numerous communication units of the Supreme High Command Reserve were created, large headquarters began to widely use mobile units, special-purpose units, personal radio stations of commanders and commanders. None of this existed before the war. Also novelties were communications through one command instance, the widespread use of telephone communications in all levels of command, radio communications of reciprocal interaction, and the implementation of communications by rear services over independent networks.

Thus, the success of many operations was ensured thanks to the knowledge of the specific situation as a result of constant communication with the troops. An interesting remark by Marshal Vasilevsky that "... there was no urgent need for I.V. Stalin to go to the front, since the Supreme Commander had all the lines of telephone and telegraph communication," and, therefore, he was well informed about the state affairs on the fronts.

conclusions

Radio communications and field telephone communications during the Second World War brought a lot of new things to the tactics of command and control. The tactics of deep breakthroughs, the offensive of large mechanized formations, the release of airborne assault forces behind enemy lines - all these measures required the provision of troops with reliable communications with the command. It is now possible to imagine satellite and tactical radio stations not only in service with various special forces and airborne units, but also in ordinary motorized rifle units. True, the saturation with modern means of communication is still small - for example, the system for exchanging tactical information between individual combat vehicles of tank and motorized rifle units in the Russian army has not yet been worked out. Nevertheless, there are many interesting hardware options for organizing the management of military units. Therefore, it is doubly interesting how it all began.

In the second part of the essay, we will consider the means of communication supplied to the USSR during the Second World War under Lend-Lease. In addition, we will also consider the communication devices used by the Wehrmacht troops.

Communication in the Wehrmacht

True, the Germans were by no means original in this matter - the same developments were in the Red Army. Another thing is that in terms of the pace of development of new radio equipment in the prewar years Germany was significantly ahead of both the USSR and the allies. This was objectively due to the fact that it was in Germany in the early 1930s. Inventions were patented that largely determined the development of radio engineering for many decades.

Knapsack combined-arms all-wave receiver "Berta" - 1935 production.
Field phone FF-33 - used in the infantry units of the Wehrmacht.
Small field switch for ten subscribers. Portable VHF infantry radio "Dora-2" - 1936 production.
Mobile infantry radio station "Friedrich" (1940).
Portable VHF infantry radio "Friedrich" (1942) and on the right - SOLDIER-MOTOR for charging batteries in the field (1944).
15-watt combined-arms HF radio.

On the left is an Emil tank VHF receiver (manufactured in 1936), on the right is a 10-watt Caesar tank transmitter (manufactured in 1938). This "bundle" was used to connect the tanks with each other and with the commander.
The tank VHF receiver of the ground-to-air channel Ukw.E.d1 (manufactured in 1939) was used to communicate tank units with dive bombers and attack aircraft.
Fug17 is an air-to-ground airborne radio station.
30-watt medium wave tank transmitter.
Fu16 - 10-watt radio station for self-propelled guns (for example, "Ferdinand"); on the left is the Heinrich receiver, on the right is the transmitter. Samples of receivers and transmitters for Luftwaffe aircraft (left), onboard receiver for blind landing by radio beam from the airport.

VHF radio "Doretta" - model Kl.Fu.Spr.d. The Germans managed to completely solve the problem of interaction between different types of armed forces only in 1944 with the advent of a small VHF radio station "Doretta" (Kl.Fu.Spr.d) - it had common channels both with tank radio stations and with Feldfu.f , and with Torn.Fu.d2. "Doretta" turned out to be really small-sized, it was worn on a waist belt, but for all its diminutiveness, it allowed for confident communication at distances of 1-2 km. True, for this they used a rather long vertical antenna and a heavy battery. It was then that German fighters and dive bombers began to be guided from the ground by a whole network of gunners with precisely such miniature radio stations.
Receiver for control services Fu.H.E.c (production - 1938).
VHF receiver for control services Fu.H.E.c (production - 1940).

Familiar key, isn't it? Approximately on this I studied at the training camp, they retrained the pancake, from the construction battalion to signalmen)))

Telegraph key from the BODO telegraph set with switching switches

Produced by Siemens & Halske in St. Petersburg before the revolution and after nationalization. The serial number of this model is "3". Railway and other types of wire communication in Russia, 1920s

Quartz calibrator for calibrating the scales of radio transmitting devices (by zero beats).

Found in the Novgorod region. Produced by factory #197 in 1940.

Tank radio receiver 71TK-1

Serial number 601, released in 1937. Found near the city of Kingisepp, in the battlefields of 1941. Presumably stood on the BT-5 tank.

Communication equipment of the Wehrmacht Tank receiver Ukw.E.e.

It was part of the Fu 5 tank radio station operating in the VHF band 27-33 MHz. This receiver was released in 1944.

Special purpose radio receiver SE 98/3.

Radio receiver Torn.E.b.

Rarely in military history have there been cases where complex interpretive structures have been built on a more limited foundation than Hitler's "blitzkrieg" theory. The term "blitzkrieg" was widely used among the German military leadership of that time, and is also widely found in the memoirs or in the correspondence of the German generals. It should be noted that it was the quick victories in the war with Poland and France that led Adolf Aloizovich to sincerely believe in the invincibility of the Third Reich and, as a result of arrogance, came to a well-deserved finale in early May 1945.

Tank radio communication

Among other conditions that led to a very quick victory of the Wehrmacht in the Polish and French companies was the widespread use of radio communications in the Wehrmacht, and more importantly, in the armored forces. All German tanks were equipped with radios that provided voice communication with other units. This allowed the German armor to quickly respond to the ever-changing situation on the battlefield. This led to last-minute changes in tactical decisions, impromptu formations much faster than the enemy could react. Some commanders considered the ability to interact quickly the main method of war.

Networks of interacting radio stations went beyond commands from tank to tank. The radio communication system used by the Panzers also provided for radio communication between air and ground forces. Panzer divisions included Fliegerleittruppen (tactical interaction between ground forces and aviation) units that used radio stations on wheeled vehicles. According to German combatants, they never had to wait more than 15-20 minutes after sending a request before air support appeared, despite the fact that, according to Luftwaffe standards, about an hour was allocated for this.

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Fu-1TE (FuG-1)

Torn.E.b receiver with frequency range from 97 to 7095 kHz. It was used as an independent device in tank radio networks using this frequency range. Manufactured by Telefunken.

Fu-2 (FuG-2)
The radio receiver operates in the range of 22.0-33.3 MHz, this device has never been used independently, but only as an additional receiver in command tanks and relay radio stations. The receiver worked in the same frequency band as the FuG-5, which made it possible, for example, to additionally listen to regimental radio networks simultaneously with communication in the local tank radio network.

The medium wave receiver was used in command tanks, usually used to expand the capabilities of the FuG 8 radio station (Fug 8 + Fug 4). He worked in the frequency range from 1130 to 3000 kHz, he worked on the same antenna with the FuG 8 radio station.

Consists of Ukw.E.e Emil receiver and 10 W.S.c. transmitter. Two working channels in the frequency range 27.2…33.3 MHz. Start of production - 1938
Fu 5 radio stations were installed on PzKpfw tanks. II, III, IV, V Panther, VI Tiger, VIB Tiger II, 38(t), 39H 735(f), B-2 740(f), SdXfz armored vehicles. 251 and special vehicles based on them.
Fu 5 radios are the most common German tank VHF radios. They were used for telephone and telegraph communication of German tanks among themselves and with higher commanders. In addition, the Fu 5 radio equipment implemented intercom functions, providing internal negotiations for the tank crew.

Fu-6
VHF tank radio, operating in the frequency range from 22.0 to 33.3 MHz with a transmission power of 20 W, was usually used with a 2-meter whip antenna.
The main advantage over the FuG-5 was in the greater communication distance, which is approximately 4-6 km when using AM mode and 6-8 km when using CW.

The VHF tank radio station consisted of a transmitter 20 W.S.d, providing two working channels in the frequency range 42.1-47.8 MHz with an output power of 20 W and a receiver Ukw.E.d1 with the same frequency range.
Fu 7 (full name - Fu 7 SE 20 U) were intended to communicate command tanks with aircraft (ground-to-air channel). In addition to the 20.W.S.d transmitter, the Fu 7 radio station included the Ukw.E.d1 receiver. FuG 17 radios were installed on aircraft to communicate with Fu 7 tank radios.
Fu 7 radio stations were installed on Pz.Bef.Wg tanks. Ill, V, VI, VIB Tiger II, 35(t), PzBeovj. IV, SdXfz armored vehicles. 250/3 and 251/3, SdKfz.260. Production Lorenz, the beginning of production - 1939

Medium-wave 30-watt radio stations Fu 8 (full name - Fu 8 SE 30 M) were used to provide long-range communication between commander tanks and headquarters of tank formations. It consisted of a transmitter Fu 8. 30 W.S.a and a receiver Mw.E.c, providing two fixed channels in the frequency range 0.83-3.0 kHz. Types of work - TLF (A1, A2) and TLF (A3).
Fu 8 radio stations were installed on PzBefw. I and III, PzBeow. Ill, SdXfz armored vehicles. 250 / 5.250 / 12.251 / 3.251 / 5.251 / 12.251 / 18, 254. Start of production - 1944

Fu-10
Medium wave radio, used in command tanks, operated in the frequency range from 1130 to 3000 kHz with an output power of 30 watts, used a loop antenna with adjustable resonance. Range up to 10 km AM and up to 40 km CW.

Fu-11 (FuG-11)
Medium wave radio station, used in command tanks, operated in the frequency range from 1130 to 3000 kHz with an output power of 100 watts. Used at the command post of the regiment. Range up to 70 km AM and up to 200 km CW.

Fu-12 (FuG-12)
Medium wave radio set, used in command tanks, operated in the frequency range from 1130 to 3000 kHz with an output power of 80 watts. Used with 2m whip antenna.

Fu-13 (FuG-13)
Version of the Fu-6 radio station with two receivers.

Fu-15 (FuG-15)
A radio receiver operating in the frequency range from 23.0 to 24.95 MHz. It was used in the Sturmartillerie (ACS) radio networks with the Fu-16 radio station.

Fu 16 radio stations (full name - Fu-16 SE 10 U) were used for telephone and telegraph communications of German self-propelled guns.
It consisted of a radio receiver Ukw.E.h and a radio transmitter 10 W.S.h, which provided two working channels in the frequency range 23.1 ... 24.95 MHz with an output power of 10 watts. Types of work - tone telegraph (A2) and telephone (A3).
The frequency range of VHF radio stations of German self-propelled guns (23.1 ... 24.95 MHz) differed from the range of tank VHF radio stations (27.2 ... 33 MHz). This was due to the subordination system adopted in the German Wehrmacht, where self-propelled guns were not part of the armored forces. Structurally, the Fu-16 radio station repeated the Fu-5 tank radio station. Manufactured by Telefunken. Start of production - 1938

Medium wave radio station of tank reconnaissance groups.
Manufacturer: Germany. Telefunken.
Radio stations were installed on SdXfz armored vehicles. 251.
The radio station used a Torn.E.b receiver with a frequency range from 97 to 7095 kHz and a 30 W.S.a transmitter operating in the 1120 ... 3000 kHz frequency range with an output power of 30 watts. Types of work - TLG (A1) and TLF (A3). Start of production - 1940